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Keeping the Scale of Justice
Balanced – Québec Justices of the
Peace and Judicial Independence
Josh Hunter and Sarah Kraicer*

I. INTRODUCTION
Protecting judicial independence is a constitutional imperative that
requires striking a careful balance between safeguarding the role of
judges and courts and permitting governments to carry out their
constitutional responsibilities with respect to the administration of
justice. On the one hand, public confidence in the administration of
justice requires robust assurances that judges are sufficiently independent
from the Executive and Legislature that they need not fear reprisals or
expect rewards if they judge as the law requires without fear or favour.
On the other hand, the elected branches of government are responsible to
the people to ensure that judicial misconduct is dealt with appropriately,
that justice is effectively administered, including through the
“constitution, maintenance and organization” of courts, and that public
finances are managed in a fair and responsible manner.
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has discussed the
origins, content, and limits of the constitutional guarantee of judicial
independence and has consistently sought to ensure that both sides of the
balance are given appropriate weight. The Court’s most recent judicial
independence decision, Conférence des juges de paix magistrats du
Québec v. Québec (Attorney General),1 considers the financial security
aspect of requirements judicial independence in the context of a
significant Québec government court reform initiative that created a new
judicial office of Presiding Justice of the Peace (“PJP”). The Court’s
*
Josh Hunter and Sarah Kraicer are Counsel in Ontario’s Constitutional Law Branch who
were counsel for Ontario in Québec Justices of the Peace. The views expressed in this article are
theirs alone and do not represent the views of Ontario or the Ministry of the Attorney General.
1
[2016] S.C.J. No. 39, 2016 SCC 39, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 116 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Québec
Justices of the Peace”].
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unanimous decision, authored by three justices, continues this balanced
approach and further elucidates the proper roles of both the judiciary and
the elected branches of government.
The Court recognized that judicial independence required prompt
commission review of a newly created judicial office’s remuneration but
accepted that flexibility was required to avoid stymying court reform. It
therefore accepted that retroactive commission review could take place
within a reasonable period after the new office was created. It also
accepted that existing judicial officers could be reappointed to the new
office, but that their existing salaries had to be frozen until that
commission review took place. Finally, it accepted that judicial officers
could be members of broader public sector pension plans in which civil
servants were also members.
This article will explore the manner in which the Supreme Court’s
judicial independence decisions, culminating in Québec Justices of the
Peace, have tried to strike a balance between two constitutional
principles: (1) protection of the independence of the judiciary from the
Executive and the Legislature; and (2) democratic control of the public
purse and the overall structure of the administration of justice. Part II
will briefly examine the protections for judicial independence that
existed before the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. Part III will examine the major Supreme Court decisions on
judicial independence, discussing how they sought to balance the proper
roles of the judiciary, Executive, and Legislature. Finally, Part IV will
analyze the Québec Justices of the Peace case, examining how the Court
continued its history of careful balancing, in certain respects accepting
that greater protections were required to ensure the independence of
presiding justices of the peace and in other respects accepting that
sufficient flexibility had to be accorded to permit the democraticallyresponsible branches of government to reform the court system in the
public interest.

II. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE BEFORE THE ENACTMENT OF THE
CHARTER
Before 1982, only judges of the superior, county and district courts
enjoyed constitutional protection of their independence. Superior court
judges had tenure for life (changed to age 75 in 1960) during good
behaviour, removable by the Governor General only on joint address of
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the Senate and House of Commons and the remuneration of superior,
county, and district court judges had to be fixed and provided by
Parliament.2 By statute, county, district, and provincial judges in both
Ontario and Québec had security of tenure during good behaviour until
retirement age, removable for cause by the Executive after a judicial
inquiry.3 Provincial judges’ salary and benefits in both Ontario and
Québec were set by regulation.4

III. MAJOR SUPREME COURT OF CANADA JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
DECISIONS
With the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(“Charter”) in 1982, the courts began to take a more active role in defining
the contours of judicial independence. The guarantee in section 11(d) of
the Charter5 for persons charged with an offence to a hearing “by an
independent and impartial tribunal” was the starting point for a series of
challenges to legislation and other measures that were alleged to infringe
constitutional guarantees of judicial independence. In a series of cases
beginning with R. v. Valente6 up to, most recently, Québec Justices of the
Peace, the Supreme Court of Canada has considered the nature and
requirements of judicial independence guaranteed by the Constitution
and set out important limits to those guarantees.
1. R. v. Valente
In December 1982, the Crown appealed a $200 fine imposed for
careless driving to the Provincial Court (Criminal Division). The
respondent, Walter Valente, asserted that the court was not an
independent and impartial tribunal as required by section 11(d),
challenging the nature of the tenure of provincial court judges
(particularly post-retirement reappointments which were at pleasure
2
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, ss. 99-100; Constitution Act, 1960
(U.K.), 9 Eliz. II, c. 2.
3
Judges Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. J.1, ss. 7-8, 53 and 58-67; Provincial Courts Act, R.S.O.
1980, c. 398, ss. 4-8; Courts of Justice Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. T-16, ss. 80, 85, 113, and 127.
4
Provincial Courts Act, id., ss. 34(1)(c)-(d); Courts of Justice Act, id., ss. 83, 113, and 133.
In Ontario, the Government had established a non-binding remuneration commission to advise it.
Order in Council 643/80.
5
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11.
6
[1985] S.C.J. No. 77, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Valente”].
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rather than for a fixed term) and the manner in which their salaries and
pensions were fixed and provided. The judge found he lacked sufficient
impartiality to determine the Charter question, given the direct pecuniary
interest all provincial judges had in its outcome.7 The Crown appealed
to the Court of Appeal. Chief Justice Howland, writing for a unanimous
five-judge panel, held that provincial judges were sufficiently
independent.8 Mr. Valente sought and was granted leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court.
In a unanimous decision, Le Dain J. set out the degree of
independence section 11(d) constitutionally required all judges hearing
offences to have.9 The Court took a balanced approach to judicial
independence. It recognized that in order to be sufficiently independent
to try offences in a manner fair to the accused, provincial judges had to
have both individual and institutional independence, provided through
certain objective and essential constitutional guarantees of security of
tenure, financial security, and administrative independence. But in setting
out the scope of each of these protections, it also recognized that the
Executive and Legislature, as the democratically elected branches of
government responsible to the public for the prudent management of
public funds and the administration of justice, also had their proper roles
to play. Mindful of these roles, the Court carefully delineated those
measures which were constitutionally required and feasible and those
which would provide an even greater level of protection for judicial
independence and that might therefore be “preferable” or “desirable” for
a government to enact in ideal circumstances.
The Court recognized that the Constitution did not require the wide
variety of tribunals who might hear offences to all possess “the most
rigorous and elaborate conditions of judicial independence”.10 It
therefore rejected the argument that all judges must have the same
guarantees of security of tenure and financial security as sections 99 and
100 of the Constitution Act, 1867 provide to superior court judges.
Instead, the Court held that provincially-appointed judges had to have
security of tenure “until an age of retirement, for a fixed term, or for a
specific adjudicative task”. Judges’ tenure had to be “secure against
interference by the Executive or other appointing authority in a
discretionary or arbitrary manner”; they could only be removed “for
7
8
9
10

R. v. Valente, [1982] O.J. No. 1101, 3 C.R.R. 1 (Ont. Prov. Ct.).
R. v. Valente (No. 2), [1983] O.J. No. 2971, 41 O.R. (2d) 187 (Ont. C.A.).
Supra, note 6.
Id., at 692.
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cause, and that cause be subject to independent review and determination
by a process at which the judge affected is afforded a full opportunity to
be heard.” It therefore was not constitutionally required that removal be
recommended by address of the Legislature or that the report of the
judicial inquiry be binding on the Executive in determining whether to
remove a provincial judge for cause.11
The Court found that although provincial judges therefore enjoyed
appropriate security of tenure until age 65, the ability of the Executive to
reappoint judges during pleasure after retirement age did not provide
sufficient security of tenure.12 The Court noted that this concern had been
addressed by the subsequent passage of the Provincial Judges and
Masters Statute Law Amendment Act, 1983 which gave the power to
approve post-retirement continuation in office to the Chief Judge (to age
70) and the Judicial Council (to age 75) rather than to the Executive.13
Although not ideal from a security of tenure point of view, that regime
was acceptable because “it replaces the discretion of the Executive by the
judgment and approval of senior judicial officers who may reasonably be
perceived as likely to act exclusively out of consideration for the
interests of the Court and the administration of justice generally.”14
Turning to financial security, the Court rejected arguments that
provincial judges’ remuneration had to be fixed by permanent statutory
appropriation from the Consolidated Revenue Fund. Instead, the Court
held that the essential point was “that the right to salary of a provincial
court judge is established by law, and there is no way in which the
Executive could interfere with that right in a manner to affect the
independence of the individual judge.” Fixing judicial salaries by
regulation and paying them out of annual appropriations was sufficient
protection.15 Nor was it problematic that provincial judges received the
same benefits and pension as civil servants. Although it might be
preferable to provide special and separate benefits for judges, it was not
constitutionally required.16 As discussed further below, the separate
pension issue was raised again before the Court in the Québec Judges of
11

Id., at 697-98.
Id., at 698-703.
13
S.O. 1983, c. 18 cited in Valente, supra, note 6, at 705.
14
Valente, id., at 703-704. The Court of Appeal subsequently followed Valente on this
point and held that the renewal of Small Claims Court Deputy Judge appointments by the Regional
Senior Judge did not violate judicial independence. Ontario Deputy Judges’ Assn. v. Ontario
(Attorney General), [2012] O.J. No. 2865, 2012 ONCA 437 (Ont. C.A.).
15
Valente, id., at 704-707.
16
Id., at 707-708.
12

154

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d)

the Peace case, and the Supreme Court reconfirmed its holding in
Valente that judicial pensions need not be provided through a separate
judicial pension plan rather than through a public service pension plan.
Finally, the Court rejected suggestions that the Constitution
required judges to have control over all aspects of the administration
of the courts. The Court accepted, as Howland C.J.O. had in the Court
below, that the judiciary needed to have control over “matters of
administration bearing directly on the exercise of the judicial
function”, which the Court went on to state included “assignment of
judges, sittings of the court, and court lists — as well as the related
matters of allocation of court rooms and direction of the administrative
staff engaged in carrying out these functions”.17 But it rejected
suggestions that judges had to be given more complete control over the
budget and human resources of the courts. Similarly, the fact that
certain benefits available to civil servants were also made available to
provincial judges or that the Executive exercised administrative
control over certain discretionary benefits and advantages did not
undermine the independence of the provincial courts.18
2. Beauregard v. Canada
Two years later, the Supreme Court again considered the requirements
of judicial independence after Parliament decided to make federallyappointed judges contribute to a portion of the cost of their pensions by
deductions from their salaries.19 Chief Justice Dickson, writing for the
majority, recognized that judicial independence was protected not only by
the express words of the Judicature provisions of the Constitution Act,
1867 and section 11(d) of the Charter. It was also deeply rooted in the
Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867’s recognition that Canada was to
have a Constitution “similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom”.
Judicial independence therefore protected judges from interference not
only by the Executive, but also by the Legislature.20 Beauregard
thus marked the beginning of the Court’s reliance on unwritten principles
to support judicial independence even though, as the case concerned
superior court judges protected by the judicature provisions of the
17

Id., at 708-709.
Id., at 709-715.
19
Beauregard v. Canada, [1986] S.C.J. No. 50, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Beauregard”].
20
Id., at 69-74.
18
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Constitution Act, 1867 and section 11(d) of the Charter, it was unnecessary
on the facts to do so.21
At the same time as it made this move beyond the express text of the
Constitution, the Court also showed restraint by rejecting the argument
that Parliament could never decrease federally-appointed judges’
remuneration. Instead, the Court’s starting point was “recognition that
someone must provide for judicial salaries and benefits and that, by
virtue of s. 100 of the Constitution Act 1867, that someone is explicitly,
Parliament.”22 Judges therefore not only had to pay taxes and other
general deductions to which all citizens’ salaries were subjected such as
Canadian Pension Plan contributions, but could also be required to pay
contributions towards the cost of their pensions.23 Judicial independence
issues would only arise if there was some hint that a federal law reducing
judicial salaries was enacted for an improper or colourable purpose or
imposed “discriminatory treatment of judges vis-[à]-vis other citizens”.24
3. The Provincial Judges’ Reference
In 1997, after economic circumstances had led a number of provinces
to impose salary freezes or reductions on judicial salaries, the Supreme
Court revisited its earlier decisions and revised and expanded the scope
and content of the constitutional protection of judicial independence.
Chief Justice Lamer, writing for the majority, grounded judicial
independence not only in section 11(d) of the Charter (which only
applies to those charged with offences and therefore is limited to criminal
and quasi-criminal courts) but also in the unwritten principles embodied
in the Preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, thereby extending judicial
21
The controversy which this development gave rise to is discussed further below in
relation to the Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward
Island; Reference re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince
Edward Island; R. v. Campbell; R. v. Ekmecic; R. v. Wickman Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v.
Manitoba (Minister of Justice), [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Provincial Judges’ Reference”]. Even before that case was decided, commentators were warning of
the possibility that the Court’s decisions in Valente and Beauregard could lead to a radical
expansion of the requirements of judicial independence. See, e.g., I. Greene, “The Doctrine of
Judicial Independence Developed by the Supreme Court of Canada” (1988) 26 Osgoode Hall L.J.
177, at 198-206.
22
Id., at 76 (emphasis added).
23
Id., at 76-77. The Privy Council had decades earlier dismissed a claim by Saskatchewan
judges that judicial independence protected them from even having to pay income tax. Saskatchewan
(Judges) v. Saskatchewan (Attorney General), [1937] J.C.J. No. 4, [1937] 2 D.L.R. 209 (U.K.P.C.).
24
Beauregard, supra, note 19, at 77-78.
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independence to provincially-appointed judicial officials exercising civil
jurisdiction.25 The Court also introduced several additional requirements
to ensure financial security, including requiring a commission process to
be interposed between government and the judiciary to consider any
changes to judicial remuneration. While the Provincial Judges’ Reference
significantly expanded the constitutional requirements of judicial
independence,26 the decision also reconfirmed the role of legislatures and
the Executive and articulated limits on the new requirements it set out
that provided a counterbalance to the expansion of judicial independence.
Judicial independence had both individual and institutional
dimensions. Valente had dealt solely with the individual aspect of
financial security.27 The institutional dimension of financial security
required the relationship between the judiciary and the other branches of
government to be depoliticized so that courts could both be free and
appear to be free from political interference through economic
manipulation. At the same time, however, the Court recognized that
remuneration from the public purse is an inherently political concern in
the sense that it implicates general public policy and that judicial salaries
must ultimately be fixed by one of the political organs of the
Constitution, the executive or the legislature, who bear the constitutional
responsibility for managing the public purse.28
To balance these concerns, the Court rejected suggestions that judicial
salaries could never be frozen or reduced. It also rejected suggestions
that judicial salaries could only be reduced as part of a general reduction
of salaries applicable to all those paid by the public purse. Instead, it held
25

Provincial Judges’ Reference, supra, note 21, at paras. 82-109.
A move a number of commentators have criticized, both on the ground that unwritten
principles should not be used to expand the already detailed guarantees of judicial independence
contained in the text of the Constitution and on the ground that judicial remuneration commissions are
unnecessary and do not in fact depoliticize the relationship between the Executive and the judiciary or
reduce the risk of litigation. See, e.g., P.W. Hogg, “The Bad Idea of Unwritten Constitutional Principles:
Protecting Judicial Salaries” in A. Dodek and L. Sossin, eds., Judicial Independence in Context (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2010), at 28-29 and 34-36 [hereinafter “Dodek and Sossin”]; L. Sossin, “Between the
Judiciary and the Executive: The Elusive Search for a Credible and Effective Dispute-Resolution
Mechanism” in Dodek and Sossin, id., at 67-81; J. Goldsworthy, “The Preamble, Judicial Independence
and Judicial Integrity” (2000) 11:2 Constitutional Forum 60, at 60-64; J. Leclair, “Canada’s
Unfathomable Unwritten Constitutional Principles” (2002), 27 Queen’s L.J. 389-43, at 432-43;
T. Kahana, “The Constitution as Collective Agreement: Remuneration of Provincial Court Judges in
Canada” (2004), 29 Queen’s L.J. 445-488, at 459-61 and 467-69; R.G. Richards, “Provincial Court
Judges Decision – Case Comment” (1998), 61 Sask. L.R. 575 at 581-83 and 586-88; J.S. Ziegel, “The
Supreme Court Radicalizes Judicial Compensation” (1998) 9:2 Constitutional Forum 31, at 39-41.
27
Provincial Judges’ Reference, supra, note 21, at paras. 110-130.
28
Id., at paras. 131-146.
26
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that judicial salaries could be reduced, increased, or frozen, either as part
of a general measure or as part of a measure applicable only to the
judiciary as a class. However, the imperative of protecting the courts
from political interference through economic manipulation required the
imposition of an independent, objective, and effective body — a
remuneration commission — between the judiciary and the other
branches of government.29 Judicial independence also required that there
be no negotiations on judicial remuneration between the judiciary and the
other branches of government and that judicial salaries not be allowed to
fall below a basic minimum level.30
In requiring the establishment of remuneration commissions, the
Court left considerable leeway to governments to design the particulars
of the commission process. The Court was careful not “to dictate the
exact shape and powers of the independent commission here. These
questions of detailed institutional design are better left to the executive
and the legislature, although it would be helpful if they consulted the
provincial judiciary prior to creating those bodies.” Different provinces
had to “be free to choose procedures and arrangements which are
suitable to their needs and particular circumstances.”31 The Constitution
did not require any particular membership, so long as appointments were
not entirely controlled by any one of the branches of government.32 The
Court suggested, but did not require, that commissions receive
submissions from the judiciary and the government and make their
decisions based on a legislated list of relevant factors.33 It gave the
provinces’ discretion to consider the appropriate length of each
commission’s mandate, although commissions did have to convene
periodically (approximately every three to five years) to ensure judicial
remuneration was not eroded by inflation.34
Finally, and importantly, the Court rejected the argument that
commission recommendations had to be binding because “decisions
29

Id., at paras. 147-169.
Id., at paras. 186-196.
31
Id., at para. 167. See Ontario Deputy Judges’ Assn. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2006]
O.J. No. 2057, 80 O.R. (3d) 481, at paras. 36-39 (Ont. C.A.) and Masters’ Assn. of Ontario v.
Ontario, [2011] O.J. No. 1450, 2011 ONCA 243, at paras. 41-52 and 61-70 (Ont. C.A.), for
examples of where the Court of Appeal followed the Supreme Court’s flexible and balanced
approach in requiring the creation of remuneration commissions for deputy judges and case
management masters but leaving the design of the commission to the government.
32
Provincial Judges’ Reference, supra, note 21, at paras. 170-172.
33
Id., at para. 173.
34
Id., at para. 174.
30
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about the allocation of public resources are generally within the realm of
the legislature, and through it, the executive.” Provinces could choose to
make commission recommendations binding or to implement a negative
resolution procedure where they would become binding if not set aside.
But they were also free to make the recommendations non-binding so
long as the Executive or Legislature gave rational reasons, which could
be reviewed by the courts on a deferential standard, if they chose to
depart from those recommendations.35
The Court also took a balanced view to claims that certain provinces
had unconstitutionally restricted the administrative independence of the
courts. It found that the co-location of various government offices such
as Crown Attorneys, Legal Aid, etc., in courthouses did not undermine
judicial independence.36 The government could designate the initial place
at which a provincial judge was required to reside but could only change
it thereafter with the judge’s consent.37 But the Executive could not
unilaterally determine the days on which the courts would be open for
business, as this was an interference with judicial control over sittings of
the court, which the Court had previously held in Valente fell within the
administrative independence of the judiciary.38 Finally, despite calls by
the judiciary for greater control over human resources and finances, the
Court held that judicial independence did not require the courts to
administer their own budget or hire their own staff.39 By limiting the
scope of the constitutionally required level of administrative
independence, the Court left considerable scope for continued executive
involvement in court administration.40 Of course, the Executive and
judiciary must work closely together in carrying out their mutual roles in
court administration.41
35
Id., at paras. 175-185. To date, however, only one province has converted a formerly
binding remuneration commission into a non-binding one: Financial Measures (2016) Act, S.N.S.
2016, c. 2, Part II.
36
Provincial Judges’ Reference, id., at para. 252.
37
Id., at paras. 254-255 and 266.
38
Id., at paras. 267-276.
39
Id., at para. 253.
40
See G.G. Mitchell, “‘Be Careful What You Wish For’: Administrative Independence and
Alternative Models of Court Administration – the New Frontier” in Dodek and Sossin, supra, note
26, at 119-25 for a discussion of the potential implications of greater judicial control of court
finances and administration.
41
Valente, supra, note 6, at 709. For example, in Ontario, the chief justices of the various
courts have entered into Memoranda of Understanding with the Attorney General setting out their
mutual understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the Executive and judiciary in courts
administration. Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, ss. 71-72 and 77; Justice B. Lennox,
“Judicial Independence in Canada – The Evolution” in Dodek and Sossin, id., at 632-37.
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4. Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance)
In 2002, the Supreme Court held that New Brunswick’s decision to
abolish the opportunity for provincial judges to elect supernumerary
status (the ability to continue to receive a full salary while working
reduced duties) did not infringe their security of tenure because the
office of supernumerary judge was not a separate office from that of
provincial judge. Ending the opportunity to elect supernumerary status
therefore did not deprive provincial judges of their judicial office. Nor
was the ability to elect supernumerary status such an essential part of
the office that eliminating it could affect its integrity.42 The Court did
find, however, that the Legislature’s decision to eliminate a system of
supernumerary judges that conferred an undeniable economic benefit
on provincial judges without first obtaining the recommendations of
a remuneration commission infringed their financial security and thus
was invalid.43
5. Ell v. Alberta
In 2003, the Supreme Court considered whether a court reform
initiative in Alberta that increased the qualifications and independence
of justices of the peace infringed judicial independence. Justices of the
peace who did not meet new qualifications set by an independent
judicial council were removed from office and offered administrative
positions as non-presiding justices of the peace.44 The Court found that
justices of the peace were entitled to judicial independence, including
security of tenure, but that the removal of the non-qualified justices of
the peace from office did not violate their security of tenure.45
The Court strongly acknowledged the importance of permitting
governments to implement court reforms to serve the public good by
improving the administration of justice and the independence of the
judiciary. The principles of judicial independence should not be

42
Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), [2002] S.C.J. No. 13, [2002] 1 S.C.R.
405, at paras. 42-49 (S.C.C.).
43
Id., at paras. 50-70.
44
Justice Statutes Amendment Act, 1998, S.A. 1998, c. 18, ss. 2.1(1), 2.2(2), and 2.4(8).
45
Ell v. Alberta, [2003] S.C.J. No. 35, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 857, at paras. 22-26 (S.C.C.). The
Ontario Divisional Court had earlier found that Ontario justices of the peace were entitled to judicial
independence. Ontario Federation of Justices of the Peace Assns. v. Ontario, [1999] O.J. No. 78, 43
O.R. (3d) 541 (Ont. Div. Ct.).
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interpreted so as to prevent such court reforms from taking place in a
timely fashion. The Court stated, that
[t]enure cannot be viewed as an absolute. If an absolute, necessary
reforms would be almost impossible. … A legislated change resulting
in a removal from office undertaken upon the advice of an independent
Judicial Council is justified if it is necessary to accommodate
significant reforms that are considered integral to public confidence in
the administration of justice.46

Judicial independence was not an end in itself. Rather, it is a means to
safeguard our constitutional order and to maintain public confidence in
the administration of justice.47 Removal from office that was reasonably
intended to further the interests that underlie the principle of judicial
independence was not arbitrary and advanced rather than undermined the
judicial independence of Alberta’s justices of the peace.48 Unlike the
Executive, which can never remove a judicial official without cause as
determined by a judicial inquiry at which the judicial officer has the right
to be heard, the Legislature can remove judicial officials without cause
when doing so reflects a good faith and considered decision of the
Legislature intended to advance the public interests that judicial
independence is intended to protect.49
The Court in Ell also held that there was no requirement that
incumbents be grandfathered when reforms were being made to their
judicial offices. Once the Legislature has established that an office is in
need of significant structural reform, it is not obligated to potentially
delay that reform for many years by grandfathering incumbents. Public
confidence in the administration of justice could be harmed by delaying
beneficial court reforms, and by retaining incumbents in office who no
longer meet minimum qualifications.50
6. Provincial Judges Association of New Brunswick v. New
Brunswick et al.
In 2005, the Court heard appeals of judicial reviews of four provinces’
responses to their respective judicial remuneration commissions and clarified
46
47
48
49
50

Ell, id., at para. 36.
Id., at para. 29.
Id., at para. 33.
Id., at paras. 35-36.
Id., at paras. 49-51.
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the test that should be applied when assessing whether a government’s
reasons for departing from a remuneration commission’s recommendations
meet the constitutional standard of “rationality” articulated in the Provincial
Judges’ Reference.51 The Court again held that judicial independence did not
require commission recommendations to be binding:
A commission’s report is consultative. The government may turn it into
something more. Unless the legislature provides that the report is
binding, the government retains the power to depart from the
commission’s recommendations as long as it justifies its decision with
rational reasons.52

Those reasons in turn are subject to judicial review by the courts, but
the standard of judicial review is a deferential one.
The Court then gave further guidance as to what reasons will meet the
constitutional standard of rationality. The reasons must be “legitimate”,
that is, reveal a consideration of the judicial office and an intention to
deal with it appropriately, not to manipulate it.53 The government’s
reasons must also rely upon a reasonable factual foundation. The
government must indicate the factual basis upon which it bases its
decision and, on the face of the evidence before a reviewing court, it
must have been rational for the government to rely on those facts. The
facts led by the government need only persuade the court that there is a
rational basis for the government’s decision.54
Finally, the court must consider the response from a global
perspective to determine whether the government has engaged in a
meaningful way with the process of the commission and given a rational
answer to its recommendations. Throughout, the court must bear in mind
that the commission process is flexible and that, while the commission’s
recommendations can only be rejected for legitimate reasons, deference
must be shown to the government’s response.55 Where a court finds that
the government has failed to meet the rationality standard, the
appropriate remedy will generally be to return the matter to the
government for reconsideration. Reviewing courts should avoid issuing
51
Provincial Judges’ Reference, supra, note 21, at paras. 183-184; Provincial Court Judges’ Assn.
of New Brunswick v. New Brunswick (Minister of Justice); Ontario Judges’ Assn. v. Ontario (Management
Board); Bodner v. Alberta; Conférence des juges du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General); Minc v. Quebec
(Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 47, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 286 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bodner”].
52
Bodner, id., at paras. 19-21.
53
Id., at paras. 23-25 and 32.
54
Id., at paras. 26 and 33-37.
55
Id., at paras. 38-43.
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specific orders to make the recommendations binding unless the
governing statutory scheme gives them that option.56
The commission process outlined in the Provincial Judges’ Reference
and Bodner involves the government, the judiciary, and an independent
commission in a multi-stage, multi-forum process that balances the roles
of all three participants. In a non-binding commission process, none of
the three participants can unilaterally determine judicial remuneration.
The role of the judiciary and the need to protect their independence is
respected and recognized through the requirement of a commission and
the right to seek judicial review of the government’s response to its
recommendations (and for other judges to conduct the judicial review).
The role of the government and its ultimate responsibility for the public
purse is recognized in its ability to depart from commission
recommendations with rational reasons and the deferential standard
applied on judicial review to those reasons. The balanced approach the
Court adopted in Bodner was unfortunately only partially effective in
stemming the tide of litigation over judicial remuneration. Litigation
continued over provincial court judges’ compensation as well as that of
other judicial officers such as Small Claims Court deputy judges, case
management masters, and Federal Court prothonotaries.57 To date,
however, none of those cases have reached the Supreme Court.
56

Id., at para. 44.
See L. Sterling and S. Hanley, “The Case for Dialogue in the Judicial Remuneration
Process” in Dodek and Sossin, supra, note 26, at 49-52 and 61-62, who suggest that although the
greater clarity the Court provided concerning the standard of review has helped to reduce litigation
concerning judicial remuneration, allowing greater scope for dialogue between governments and
judiciary in the process leading up to Commission recommendations could help reduce it further. For
examples of litigation concerning judicial remuneration post-Bodner, see Manitoba Provincial
Judges’ Assn. v. Manitoba, [2013] M.J. No. 279, 2013 MBCA 74 (Man. C.A.); Provincial Court
Judges’ Assn. of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2017] B.C.J. No. 214,
2017 BCCA 63 (B.C.C.A.); Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. of British Columbia v. British Columbia
(Attorney General), [2015] B.C.J. No. 574, 2015 BCCA 136 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC
dismissed [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 199 (S.C.C.); Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. of New Brunswick v.
New Brunswick (Minister of Justice and Consumer Affairs), [2009] N.B.J. No. 278, 2009 NBCA 56
(N.B.C.A.); Québec (Procureur général) c. Conférence des juges du Québec, [2007] J.Q. no 10867,
2007 QCCA 1250 (Que. C.A.); Québec (Procureur général) c. Conférence des juges municipaux du
Québec, [2007] J.Q. no 10868, 2007 QCCA 1251 (Que. C.A.); Nova Scotia Presiding Justices of the
Peace Assn. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [2013] N.S.J. No. 61, 2013 NSSC 40 (N.S.S.C.);
Aalto v. Canada (Attorney General), [2010] F.C.J. No. 949, 2010 FCA 195 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal
to SCC dismissed [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 352 (S.C.C.); Assn. of Justices of the Peace of Ontario v.
Ontario, [2016] O.J. No. 5474, 2016 ONSC 6001 (Ont. Div. Ct.), leave to appeal to C.A. dismissed
March 20, 2017 (Ont. C.A.); Assn. of Justices of the Peace of Ontario v. Ontario, [2014] O.J.
No. 5010, 2014 ONSC 6130 (Ont. Div. Ct.), leave to appeal to C.A. dismissed May 11, 2015 (Ont.
C.A.); Assn. of Justices of the Peace of Ontario v. Ontario, [2013] O.J. No. 1, 2013 ONSC 27 (Ont.
S.C.J.), affd [2013] O.J. No. 3911, 2013 ONCA 532 (Ont. C.A.); Assn. of Justices of the Peace of
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IV. CONFERENCE DES JUGES DE PAIX MAGISTRATS DU QUÉBEC V.
QUÉBEC (ATTORNEY GENERAL) (“QUÉBEC JUSTICES OF THE PEACE”)
The one judicial independence decision that has reached the Supreme
Court in recent years arose from Québec’s decision to reform its justice of
the peace regime in 2004 in response to a Québec Court of Appeal decision
finding the former regime did not satisfy the requirements of judicial
independence. Québec created the new Office of Presiding Justice of the
Peace (“PJP”) with a distinct jurisdiction and remuneration from the
previous office of Justice of the Peace with Extended Powers (“JPEPs”).
The six existing JPEPs were reappointed as PJPs and their remuneration
was “redlined” so that they would continue to receive the same salary as
before their appointment until the salary of newly appointed PJPs, initially
set by the Government at a lower level, caught up. All PJPs were provided
with a pension through a public service pension plan. None of these
remuneration decisions were put to a remuneration commission before they
were made. The new office’s remuneration was only subject to commission
review on a prospective basis from 2007 onwards.
The Court found that while prior review by a commission was not
constitutionally required, the lack of any retroactive commission review
of salary levels from 2004 to 2007 within a reasonable time after
appointment violated the financial security guarantee. The Court rejected
all other challenges to the new regime and held that the salaries from
2007 on which had been subject to commission review were valid. The
Court’s decision provided mixed success to the parties and in doing so
recognized that legislatures have the constitutional ability to create,
transform and abolish judicial offices, so long as that power is exercised
consistently with the principles of judicial independence.58
1. Justices of the Peace in Québec Before 2004
The office of JPEP was created in 1870.59 Justices of the Peace who
were not granted extended powers came to be known as Justices of the
Ontario v. Ontario, [2014] O.J. No. 3305, 2014 ONSC 4231 (Ont. S.C.J.); Ontario Deputy Judges’
Assn. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2006] O.J. No. 2057, 80 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.); Ontario
Deputy Judges Assn. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2009] O.J. No. 2880, 98 O.R. (3d) 89 (Ont.
Div. Ct.); Masters’ Assn. of Ontario v. Ontario, [2011] O.J. No. 1450, 2011 ONCA 243 (Ont. C.A.).
58
Québec Justices of the Peace, supra, note 1, at para. 1.
59
An Act to provide for the appointment of Justices of the Peace with more extensive
jurisdiction, S.Q. 1870, c. 12; Courts of Justice Act, CQLR, c. T-16, ss. 186-88.
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Peace with Limited Powers (“JPLPs”).60 By 2004, there were
approximately 600 JPLPs and only six JPEPs.61 JPLPs served part-time
and exercised predominantly administrative tasks but did conduct some
judicial tasks while JPEPs served full-time and exercised a broader range
of judicial functions. JPLPs were public servants appointed during
pleasure. In 1992, JPEPs were given security of tenure unless removed
for cause under the same procedure that applied to removing provincial
judges.62 The Order appointing each JPEP set their salary at 72 per cent
of the salary of a provincial judge and they were permitted to join a
public sector pension plan.63
2. Pomerleau and the Creation of Presiding Justices of the Peace
In 2002, the Québec Court of Appeal held that the existing system for
JPLPs was unconstitutional on the basis that, as at pleasure appointees, they
lacked the requisite degree of security of tenure.64 Leave was sought to the
Supreme Court which, in light of its then-recent decision in Ell that Justices
of the Peace were entitled to judicial independence, remitted it to the Court
of Appeal for reconsideration.65 On remand, the Attorney General of
Québec conceded that JPLPs lacked judicial independence and the Court
declared that the provisions governing them were unconstitutional.66
The National Assembly responded six months later by replacing the
existing offices of JPEP and JPLP with two new offices: PJPs and
administrative justices of the peace.67 Administrative justices of the
60
After a 1919 amendment allowed the jurisdiction of any Justice of the Peace to be limited
to the purposes set forth in his commission. An Act to amend the Revised Statutes, 1909, respecting
the jurisdiction of certain justices of the peace, S.Q. 1919, c. 45.
61
Pomerleau c. R., [2003] J.Q. No. 19020, [2004] R.J.Q. 83 at para. 23 (Que. C.A.)
[hereinafter “Pomerleau (2003)”].
62
Courts of Justice Act, supra, note 63, s. 162, as amended by An Act respecting the
implementation of certain provisions of the Code of Penal Procedure and amending various
legislative provisions, S.Q. 1992, c. 61, s. 617.
63
Originally the Government and Public Employees Retirement Plan and then, after 2001,
the Pension Plan of Management Personnel. An Act respecting the Pension Plan of Management
Personnel, S.Q. 2001, c. 31, s. 393; Courts of Justice Act, id., s. 162.1, as amended by An Act to
amend the Courts of Justice Act, the Act respecting municipal courts and other legislative
provisions, S.Q. 2002, c. 32, s. 7.
64
R. c. Pomerleau, [2002] J.Q. no. 5061 (Que. C.A.).
65
R. c. Pomerleau, [2002] C.S.C.R. no 522 (S.C.C.).
66
Pomerleau (2003), supra, note 61, at paras. 25-35.
67
Courts of Justice Act, supra, note 63, ss. 158 and 161, as amended by An Act to amend
the Courts of Justice Act and other legislative provisions as regards the status of justices of the
peace, S.Q. 2004, c. 12.
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peace served during pleasure and were given a limited range of functions
that did not require judicial independence.68
PJPs were given a broader range of judicial functions, including
conducting trials for provincial offences and non-criminal federal
offences, issuing arrest and search warrants although, unlike the former
JPEPs, they cannot conduct bail hearings or try summary conviction
criminal offences.69 They have security of tenure during good behaviour
until age 70 unless removed for cause after a judicial inquiry.70 Their
salary and benefits were to be set by the same remuneration commission
process as provincial judges but not until 2007. Until then, the
Government could set their salary and benefits unilaterally. As well, PJPs
(like JPEPs) were to be members of the Pension Plan of Management
Personnel rather than the Pension Plan for Cour du Québec and
Municipal Court judges.71
The existing JPEPs were deemed to be appointed as PJPs without
having to go through the usual selection process.72 JPEPs continued to
receive their previous salary, benefits, and pension until the salary of the
office of PJP equalled or exceeded it.73 That salary was $137,280 as of June
30, 2004. The Government set the initial salary of new PJPs at $90,000.74
After the first new PJPs were appointed in 2005, the Conférence des
juges de paix magistrats (the “Conférence”) was created to represent the
interests of PJPs.75 In 2008, the remuneration commission for the period
2004 to 2007 (the “Johnson Committee”) submitted its report. It
concluded that it lacked the authority to retroactively review PJP
remuneration for the years 2004 to 2007, recommended that the annual
salary of PJPs be increased to $110,000 for the years 2007 to 2010, and
recommended that the salaries of the former JPEPs remain frozen. The
Government accepted these recommendations.76
68

Id., s. 160 and Sch. IV.
Id., s. 173 and Sch. V.
70
Id., ss. 161 and 165-68.
71
Id., ss. 175-79 and Part VI.4; An Act to amend the Courts of Justice Act and other
legislative provisions as regards the status of justices of the peace, supra, note 67, ss. 30-32.
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An Act to amend the Courts of Justice Act and other legislative provisions as regards the
status of justices of the peace, id., ss. 26-29 and 35.
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Id., s. 27. JPEPs who were members of the Government and Public Employees
Retirement Plan could elect to join the Pension Plan of Management Personnel.
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Québec Justices of the Peace, supra, note 1, at paras. 11-12; Conférence des juges du
Québec c. Québec (Procureur général), [2007] J.Q. no 5681, 2007 QCCS 2672, [2007] R.J.Q. 1556
(Que. C.S.); Décret/Order 689-2004.
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Québec Justices of the Peace, id., at para. 13.
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3. The Courts and Remuneration Commissions Consider the
Remuneration of Presiding Justices of the Peace
The Conférence commenced litigation in 2008 arguing that the
remuneration process failed to respect the judicial independence of
PJPs.77 While that case was working its way through the courts, two
more remuneration commissions reported. In 2010, the D’Amours
Committee recommended that the salary of PJPs be increased to
$119,000 and that the salaries of the former JPEPs remain unchanged.
The Government accepted those recommendations. In 2013, the Clair
Committee reviewed the salary of PJPs again. By 2013, the salary of
PJPs had increased beyond that of the former JPEPs and there were no
longer two tiers of remuneration based on appointment date.78 Both the
Québec Superior Court and Court of Appeal rejected the Conférence’s
claims that the provisions regarding the remuneration of PJPs infringed
judicial independence.79 The Conférence sought and was granted leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
4. The Supreme Court Decision
In a unanimous decision written by Karakatsanis, Wagner and Côté
JJ., the Court granted the appeal in part. It acknowledged the power and
responsibility of legislatures with respect to the administration of justice,
including the power to “create, transform and abolish judicial offices.”
The Court accepted that such reforms can enhance public confidence in
the administration of justice, improve the independence and qualifications
of judicial officers, adapt to new realities, and increase access to justice.
This power is, however, limited by the constitutional requirements of
judicial independence.80
The issue before the Court was to identify the requirements of
financial security that applied in the context of a court reform that
abolished an old office and created a new office. The Court held that
commission review of the initial salary of a new judicial office was
required. Otherwise, there would be a risk that the creation of a new
77
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judicial office could be perceived as a means to interfere with the
judiciary through economic manipulation as there was still a possibility
of economic manipulation. Further, commission review was required to
assure the public that the initial salary met the constitutional minimum.81
The Court did not agree, however, that commission review of initial
salary in this context had to be “prior review”; instead, the review could
take place within a reasonable time (months, not years) after the creation
of the new judicial office. This requirement is different than that which
applies to changes or freezes to the remuneration of sitting judges which
can only be undertaken after prior review by a commission. The Court
found that a less onerous requirement of subsequent retroactive
commission review would satisfy judicial independence in this context,
given the Legislature’s constitutional power to reform courts and the fact
that the risk of economic manipulation is not as strong in the context of
the creation of a new judicial office as compared to a change or freeze
applied to a sitting judge. The Court stated that this requirement would
both be a “sufficient safeguard for the financial security guarantee” and
“enable legislatures to fulfill their constitutional role effectively” by
providing “governments with flexibility, while not imposing unwarranted
barriers to the effective implementation of court reform initiatives.” It
also noted that subsequent retroactive review is more practical and
efficient, as it allows time for judicial associations of new office holders
to form in order to participate fully in the commission process, and
avoids delays inherent in the establishment of a commission process.82
The Court concluded that the same subsequent retroactive
commission review process satisfies the judicial independence of both
new appointees and sitting judicial officers reappointed to the new office.
While reappointed sitting judges are more susceptible to the risk of
economic manipulation because of their existing relationship with the
Government, the practical considerations regarding delay, representation,
and avoiding barriers to reform apply equally to both groups.
Considering the remuneration of both groups together also is more
effective. To address the higher risk of economic manipulation, however,
the Court held that the Government must maintain and cannot change the
remuneration of sitting judges reappointed to a new office until after
commission review.83
81
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Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that the 2004
reforms had in fact created a new judicial office and were not simply an
adjustment to an existing office. PJPs have a narrower jurisdiction than
the former JPEPs, benefit from greater judicial independence guarantees,
and both the structure and the Parliamentary history of the 2004
Amending Act suggest the National Assembly intended to create a new
judicial office.84 Therefore, prior commission review of the initial salary
of neither reappointed JPEPs nor newly appointed PJPs was required.85
The Court found, however, that the delay of any commission review
to 2007 and the fact that that review was not retroactive meant that the
2004 Amending Act did violate judicial independence, as the initial
salary was not subject to any commission review during the period from
the first appointments in 2005 to 2007. The Court held that three years
was not a reasonable time.86
The Court rejected other arguments made by the Conférence alleging
violations of judicial independence. It held that there was no constitutional
bar to setting the remuneration of new appointees at one level and
maintaining the remuneration of transferred appointees at existing higher
levels; indeed, the government may be entirely justified in doing so as such
a salary gap does not infringe judicial independence. Equally, the Court
held that there was no violation of judicial independence after 2007. Given
the Government did comply with its obligation to periodically submit the
remuneration of PJPs to commission review after 2007, the fact that the
pre-2007 remuneration level was only one of the factors those commissions
considered, and the fact that judicial independence “is not intended to serve
as a means of labour arbitration to ensure better remuneration for judges”,
the Court found that public confidence in the post-2007 remuneration
would not have been undermined by the lack of commission review from
2004 to 2007.87
Finally, the Court rejected the Conférence’s argument that there was
anything problematic with judicial officers being members of a broader
public sector pension plan of which civil servants were also members.
Membership in a public sector pension plan does not preclude adapting
that plan to the specific characteristics of judicial office. Judicial
independence does not require that a pension plan be exclusive to or
controlled by judges or that there be a special part of the plan tailored to
84
85
86
87
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judges. It does, however, require that any changes to the plan as it applies to
judicial officers be submitted to a commission for prior review before being
made. The Court also rejected the argument that, because it was not
designed to reflect the shorter average length of a judicial career compared
to a civil service career, the existing pension plan failed to meet the basic
minimum constitutional threshold. Three remuneration commissions had
evaluated the pension plan and found it to be adequate. The constitutional
test was not whether PJPs had as beneficial a pension plan as provincial
judges, but whether it met the constitutional minimum standard.88
The remedy the Court ordered was also balanced. It rejected both the
Conférence’s suggested remedy — striking down all the Orders setting
the remuneration of PJPs since 2004 and requiring a commission to
review the entire period — and the Government’s — a declaration of
invalidity and a declaration that in the future, a commission must review
the initial remuneration of any new office. Instead, it crafted a more
nuanced response. The Court struck down the provisions of the 2004
Amending Act that provided for a freeze of the former JPPEs’ salary and
allowed the Government to unilaterally determine the remuneration of
the new office without any retroactive commission review. It then
ordered that a remuneration commission retroactively review the
remuneration of PJPs for the period 2004 to 2007 only. The remuneration
orders made as a result of the three post-2007 remuneration commissions
were allowed to stay in place.89
5. Pension Postscript – The Blais Committee
On September 23, 2016, the most-recent Québec remuneration
commission, the Blais Committee, issued its report. As the Supreme
Court had not yet released its decision requiring retroactive review for
the years 2004 to 2007, the Blais Committee limited itself to considering
the period from July 1, 2016 to June 30, 2019 as it had been mandated to
do. It found that significant challenges in recruiting PJPs could be traced
to the office’s less beneficial pension. It therefore recommended that
PJPs be allowed to join the Pension Plan for Cour du Québec and
Municipal Court judges. Given the impact of that more generous pension
plan on overall remuneration, the Committee did not recommend further
salary increases above the Consumer Price Index (CPI) so long as its
88
89
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pension recommendations were implemented; if they were not, it
recommended that the salary of PJPs be increased by 30 per cent over
three years. It also recommended that PJPs receive the same group
insurance benefits as provincial judges.90
The National Assembly accepted the recommendation that PJPs be
allowed to join the Pension Plan for Cour du Québec and Municipal Court
judges with certain modifications. PJPs would have until September 1,
2018 to elect whether to transfer pension plans. The actuarial value of a
given PJP’s participation in the Pension Plan of Management Personnel was
to be determined in light of the plan as it stood on December 31, 2016.
Those PJPs who elected not to transfer pension plans would continue to
receive a pension in accordance with the terms of the Pension Plan of
Management Personnel as it stood on December 31, 2016 and would not be
subject to any future changes to the plan. The National Assembly also
accepted the recommendations to increase the salary of PJP by CPI and to
grant them the same group insurance benefits as provincial judges.91 It
remains to be seen what, if any, further remuneration increases will be
proposed by the commission that retroactively considers the remuneration
of PJPs for the years 2004 to 2007.

V. CONCLUSION
Québec Justices of the Peace is the latest judgment in a series of cases
where the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the constitutional requirement of
setting judicial remuneration through a Commission process. The case does
not revisit the Court’s original decision to constitutionalize the commission
process or the doctrinal tools such as unwritten constitutional principles on
which it relied in doing so, as some commentators have suggested it should.
The Court does clarify, however, that those principles must be interpreted in
a practical and flexible manner that respects the constitutional role of the
democratically-responsible Executive and Legislature in determining
the structure of the administration of justice and overseeing the prudent
use of the public purse.
The Court affirmed the National Assembly’s decision to create a new
judicial office in response to the concerns the Québec Court of Appeal
90
Comité de la rémunération des juges, Rapport du comité de la rémunération des juges
2016-2019 (September 23, 2016), at 124-31.
91
Minister of Justice, Réponse du gouvernement au rapport du comité de la rémunération
des juges pour la période 2016-2019 (February 2017), at 12-16; National Assembly, Journal des
debats, 41st Leg., 1st Sess., Vol. 44, No. 225 (February 9, 2017), at 13638-43.
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had expressed about a lack of judicial independence under the former
legislative regime. It gave the Legislature the flexibility to reappoint
existing judicial officers to the new office and to permit the Executive to
set the salary of new appointees for an initial period. It also recognized
that a broader public sector pension plan could meet the unique needs of
judicial officers. At the same time, it ensured judicial independence was
protected by requiring retroactive commission review of the remuneration
of the new office within a short time after its creation. By protecting
judicial independence without discarding the flexibility required to enact
needed court reforms and responsibly manage the public purse and the
administration of justice, the Court has given helpful practical guidance
to future court reform efforts and has signalled that while governments
must pay heed to the requirements of judicial independence and cannot
avoid mandatory commission review of remuneration, those requirements
must also permit the Executive and Legislature to enact court reforms in
a timely and responsible manner.

